JPRS 76650

20 October 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1642

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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CLAES DISCUSSES AILING STEEL INDUSTRY, POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 19 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by M.H.: "Willy Claes: 'Cockerill May Survive But It Must Have Better Management"--passages between slantlines published in italics]

> [Text] "Cockerill has certain, genuine handicaps. For example: the geographically scattered units of production. The firm, however, does not show structural reasons for not being socially and economically viable. In fact, it combines a set of particularily significant structural advantages which underline its potential to compete on the international market, hence its social and economic viability."
>
> This diagnosis, recently stated by Willy Claes, is a contrast to the picture presented by a financially drained firm that seems to be the only one, in spite of relatively favorable circumstances in the steel industry at this time, to have been accused, last year, not only of having had poor results, but also of not reaching those of 1978.
>
> Under these circumstances, should one look for the source of the weaknesses particular to Cockerill outside the economic stagnation that has hit the whole sector?

The minister of finance seems to think so. And, no doubt, the opinion he voices can be considered an important element in the file, at a time when some people wonder, albeit in veiled terms, whether the only cure for the giant of Liege would not be euthanasia.

Since, on the one hand, the [word illegible] on the future of the steel industry focused, since Monday, especially on the fate of Cockerill, and on the other hand has taken on a regrettably emotional and political tone, it would be helpful to return to a discussion of economics.

Thus, Willy Claes, in answer to a series of criticisms set forth in a memorandum addressed to him in July by private, steady shareholders from the Liege group (the holdings), to a great extent repeated in our previous issues, has written or proposed a synthesis of the problem, entitled: "Strengths and Weaknesses of Cockerill, and Its Management."

Undeniable Assets

Among the assets which allow him to state that Cockerill is economically and socially viable, the minister of finance notes the following points: a relatively steep rise in integration, particularly in France; a relatively low percentage of sales in exports, namely on the most vulnerable market; a range of products among the most varied in Europe, with a market value that is relatively higher than that of the competition.

With regard to cost, he continued, precise studies carried out in the field by the Ministry of Finance (for the initiated they are studies similar to AVO [expansion unknown] and AVS [expansion unknown] have shown: that the improvements needed can be done from a technical point (personnel and other costs); that if these improvements are made, Cockerill could exceed its short-term cash balance and reach the threshold of economic and social viability.

Willy Claes emphasizes that this corroborates the classification of technical tools done in 1977 and 1978 (McKinsey Report) which shows that in the short run there are no significant problems with most of the company's existing equipment. Beyond that, and for the long run, however, the finance minister emphasized that a certain amount of investment is needed, as is the case for the steel industry worldwide. This is the reason for the present program.

However, Some Weaknesses

These are the strong points. But what are the weak points?

For example, the poor economic and social results are caused by certain weak or negative operational aspects.

Willy Claes shows himself to be tough, even though he makes qualified statements.

He says that in general there are signs that criteria and methods for sound management have been abandoned, and these are the only guarantees the firm has for socioeconomic viability in the long run.

And he reproaches that the use made of state help is often untimely and is mainly centered on using public funds to compensate for poor management without necessarily looking for a viable, final objective.

The reproach is strong. It is even a crucial one in the present debate in the steel industry, and it is based on the following observations: very loose management in key areas, for instance not knowing the total cost of production by the kind of products made, overstocking, uneven quality of finished products (which contributes to a loss of important orders for the firm), and delays in inadequate deliveries; as well as focusing exclusively on long-term operational factors, such as concentrating, among other things, on big projects that will be profitable in the more distant future to the detriment of more limited operations but which would bring immediate profits.

Readjusting the Aim

Does this mean that Cockerill is poorly managed? Willy Claes does not say so outright. However, his comments and reproaches, of which the above is not a complete list, indicate that in his opinion the aim should be readjusted in order to preserve the viability of the firm. A viability which he finally offers in answer to the criticisms put forth by his partners from the private sector such as the paralysis of management which, they say, is caused by its politicization, bureaucratization and, finally, the conflicts inherent in such a diverse group of shareholders within the company.

And one comes back to the political debate, started by the same steady shareholders from the private sector in Cockerill, when they want to reorganize the company's administrative council so that every shareholder be represented in proportion to his capital investment (the state is the major shareholder) NDLR [expansion unknown]. Hence, the transfer of responsibility from management to the government...

Strong Union Reactions

Union leaders reacted as early as Tuesday morning. Those of the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] sent telegrams to Messrs Claes, Martens, and Davignon, to ask that the agreements of the Round Table of 1978 be respected. They claim that renegotiating the agreements is out of the question. The CSC from Liege warns "against the possibility of serious disturbances that could take place in the Liege area if these agreements are not respected."

The reaction of the Cockerill FGTB [General Federation of Labor of Belgium] is identical to that of the CSC. It wants to keep in Liege two heated lines and two continuous casting operations. It has also decided to wait and see what position will be taken by the "Steady, Private Sector Associates" (APS) before it will continue its participation in restructuring the steel industry enterprises, as anticipated by the Claes plan.

Finally, at a meeting of the CSC militants, it was observed that "the steelworkers alone have carried out and supported the recommendations of the Round Table of 1978 by increasing productivity and accepting the plan of disengagement and rationalization."

/Filialisation [as published]? What is that? a man asked me. The word filialisation [as published], it is true, is not in the Larousse, the authoritative dictionary. The question shows well enough that the debate is going over people's heads (which does not mean that any outcome of the options debated today would be accepted without causing great upheavals)/. [published in boldface]

However, if the powder keg has been lit, at present it is moving along quietly, deeply, and imperceptibly. At factory gates, in nearby neighborhoods, and in bedroom-cities in the valleys, one finds only opaque indifference to the battle of the declarations of intention, to the war of communiques, denials, and threats.

An indifference which is not at variance with the minor unrest organized on Tuesday in Seraing: no one can truly believe that there is a revolution (even with a small "r") in the air in Liege. This change in Labor must, therefore, be considered at a second or third level.

The worker involved in the production process or in the conversion of steel in essence sees only his own working conditions and whether they are improving or not, his salary's buying power, and he worries a great deal about job security.

Beyond that, he pays little attention to these gueguerres [as published] with pinpricks, as he views them, and which only fascinate the political and union thinkers: real arguments about everyone's share in the government's budget, wrong arguments about the public debt, true or feigned maneuvers and mistakes (paratroopers in Turkey, the 2 percent, NATO's opinion of Belgium).

/All this is an act,/ said the person speaking to me.

The judgment is final, however...on the day when he decides that "they" tamper with his conditions for survival, I would guess that the man speaking to me would say just as flatly: /This is too much, "they" are going too far./ And he will get going.

The question one can ask is: how far can one go in this crisis without arousing the kind of reaction that will have unexpected effects.

9465
CSO: 3100

OIL DISCOVERY, DRILLING IN NORTH SEA DESCRIBED

Bonn DIE WELT in German 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Armin Reck: "A North Sea Find for 30,000 Rabbits"]

[Text] Off the west coast of Schleswig-Holstein, 2,950 meters under the mudflats, lies Germany's Oil-Dorado. Texaco discovered 10 million tons of crude oil here, more than twice as much as the 100 German oilfields produced together in 1979.

The turbulence from the rotors makes the gray-black silt in the shallow waters of the Elbe estuary boil. The four-seater Alouette II almost touches the 6.5 meter high and 90 meter long black steel wall. FAIRALP 2 is painted on it in giant letters. The pilot climbs--to a height of 52 meters--and circles the tip of the drilling tower which stands on one of the two flooded pontoons lying side by side. Nobody is on deck, only the drilling pipes lie stacked up--they are not needed any more. The helicopter turns away again in the direction of Cuxhaven.

300 meters under us lie the mudflats and 2,950 meters deeper is oil--a lot of oil. So much oil, that Texaco does not want strangers on the platform. Oil discoveries of this magnitude have become rare in Germany.

According to estimates by the German Texaco-Wintershall consortium, as much as 10 million tons of crude oil are lying under the mudflats off the shrimp fishing port of Friedrichskoog on the west coast of Schleswig-Hostein. More than twice the total pumped out of the 100 German oilfields in 1979 (4,733,515 tons). Or: with just the gasoline portion of what is produced 30,000 VW Rabbits could become independent of oil shipments from abroad. "Our eyes practically popped out, when we heard about the discovery," says Helmut Spiller, head of the technical division of the Economic Association for Petroleum Extraction (WEG) in Hanover. He will have to show even greater astonishment; a few days ago new figures were released: production will not be 5.5 tons/hour, but nearly 18. That is more than three times as much per hour as the smallest German oilfield, Grosses Meer, in the Weser-Ems area, produced last year (5 tons).

The interest of the U.S. parent company in the discovery of its small German affiliate is cause for attention. But those responsible at German Texaco on the Ueberseering in Hamburg, the fashionable address of almost all the multinational oil concerns in Germany, are concealing their pride.

True, feelings of success can also lie in cold figures: "100 meters can be critical in the choice of a drilling site," Harald Graeser, spokesman for Texaco told us. According to that, geologists and technicians have hit the bullseye from the sandbank Mittelplate, 7.5 km off Friedrichskoog and 22 km north of Cuxhaven. On the first try.

On the average 13 drillings are needed before a productive hole is found. This success is not diminished by the admission that 15 years ago oil was discovered 5 km to the south. At the time the amount of oil did not seem enough to be profitable.

Even today the maximum estimated annual production of the Mittelplate I drilling platform of about 150,000 tons of crude oil seems pathetic compared to the annual German requirement of 144 million tons. But when the price of crude oil at the German border rose to DM 287 in 1979, it appeared to be worthwhile again.

"Our friends in the East have done a lot to get oil explorers in Germany going again," as Helmut Spiller summarizes the new philosophy, following the motto "Many a little makes a muckle."

Texaco remembered its home sources and the decades-old exploration rights in Schleswig-Holstein, including those on the mudflats.

Two alternative drilling techniques were available: a shallow-draft pumping platform, which is sunk onto the seabed, or an artificial island dredged out of the sand, on which giant pontoons are sunk as a foundation for the drilling tower.

Texaco, whose half of the involvement as the "operator" was planning, equipment and crew, and Wintershall, which had the other half (according to spokesman Kurt Vongeler: "Only financial"), decided, according to Texaco, in favor of the "technically cleanest solution." They chartered two floating pontoons in Hamburg and set up their drilling equipment on them, a technique that had already proven itself off the East Frisian island of Juist.

Experts consider drilling inside the 3-mile limit "mainland drilling." That may be true for the drilling tower itself, which has already drilled American rock and was then shipped to Germany, but not for supplies.

Georg Goerlich, head of the supply base in Cuxhaven, said: "We are extremely dependent on the tides and the weather. The helicopter can take people to the platform even in a Force 11 wind and can find its landing point in the heaviest fog with its radio direction link, but it is more difficult with material." For 4 days a storm prevented urgently needed equipment from being transferred to the platform. A loss of time that cost tens of thousands. They had started drilling in June 1979 and estimated the cost at DM 4.5 million. They discovered oil in September and the cost had doubled.

The tidal clock ticks inexorably. Even at high tide the deepsea tug can approach to within only 500 meters of the island, with its pontoons in tow. Then a special tug with an extremely shallow draft has to pull the pontoons (30 x 20 meters) with the equipment on board through water that has an average depth of only 1.4 meters.

The head of the Department of Oil Technology in the Hamburg head office, Heinz Klett, has quite different problems with the mud flats: "The tidal currents undermine our pontoons. We have attached plastic mats to the walls and anchored them to the seabed with giant pegs like a tent and weighted them with sandbags. This protection against erosion was the only thing that made the pontoon technique possible."

In mid-August 1979 the drilling team came across oil-bearing Jurassic sand for the first time, at a depth of 2,950 meters, and dating from the liassic period (190 to 195 million years old). "We drilled through the approximately 25 meter thick layer, cemented in the 7-inch thick end pipes and then perforated the pipes at the depth of the deposit," is how Heinz Klett explains the most tense phase of the search.

Klett explains that there is no danger of a dangerous blowout, the explosive spouting up of an oil and gas mixture: "The gas pressure in the Schleswig-Holstein deposits is very low." That means the oil has to be raised by pressure. The danger of a catastrophe by fire, such as occurred in the Norwegian oilfield Ekofisk, 350 km to the northwest, is extremely low here. Still, the oil drillers have taken "every imaginable precaution" (according to Hans-Wichart Schuenemann, head of the exploration department), in order to prevent an escape of oil. Heinz Klett says: "Now that the test phase is over, and we know the oil's flow speed, the porosity of the rock, the pressure and the characteristics of the oil, the hole will be hermetically sealed again."

Texaco estimates it will take another "2 years at least," until oil is actually flowing from the mudflats. The oil riches will certainly not be worth less then. One thing is certain right now: it does not have to be transported far, for, as Heinz Klett openly concedes, the discovery is an "ideal situation" for Texaco. The company's refinery south of Heiden is only 26 km from the discovery site. The oil is to flow directly from the borehole through pipelines for further processing. This will not create any technical and environmental problems.

Shrimp fisherman Max Clausen, 47, who previously had no reason to complain about the search for oil, is looking into the future with mixed feelings: "Until now we only had an occasional lump of oil in our boiled shrimp, but we still had to throw the whole mess out. If something happens out there with the oil, you'll be able to buy the whole harbor here. For a song." Then he stops, considers and says with deep conviction: "What am I saying, the harbor, you can have the whole coast."

9581
CSO: 3103

NEW FISCAL YEAR BUDGET, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE VIEWED

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 15 Sep 80 pp 40-42

[Article by Sylvain Gouz]

[Text] A fund for countercyclical measures of 6.5 billions of francs and a mighty boost to investment: two "gifts" for business in the '81 budget, which is nonetheless subject to strict discipline.

The 1981 budget draft is based, according to the words of the prime minister, on a desire for fiscal stability and for a reduction of public spending. A difficult match between the austerity dear to Professor Barre and the constraints of electoral survival. Mr Maurice Papon, the budget minister therefore had to perform a hard feat. The result hardly hides the ambiguities which controlled the elaboration of the 1981 budget. Taken as a whole, the latter is not permissive: 610 billions of francs for expenses which are therefore increasing by 14.6 percent in relation to last year (taking account of inflation) while the GDP should have grown by 12.3 percent. Roughly, public spending therefore still increases faster than national wealth, but less so than in previous years. The budget minister boasts nonetheless to have succeeded in obtaining important savings from his colleagues. A total of 12.8 billions of francs on state running costs (service vehicles, administrative publications, management costs), on employee hiring (less than 2000 mostly police officers and gendarmes against 14,500 this year and more than 25,000 on the average from 1974 to 1979), on assistance to public works and aid to industry (2.5 billions gained) and even on the cost of State equipment.

The initial directive of Mr Raymond Barre--cut equipment credits by 20 percent--certainly has not been obeyed to the letter but, on the whole, appropriations for civil programs, that is investment decisions, are stagnating.

The big suppliers of public markets, such as PTT (Post, Telegraph, Telephone) and notably the Direction of Telecommunications, Environment Protection, Living Conditions or Transportation are hurting. And the contractors

for public works of Mr Philippe Cl[illegible] and those for housing of Mr Jacques Barrot won't be happy. All the more as they do not believe in the efficacy of the support measures taken by Mr d'Ornano for the 1980 appropriations. The only consolation for the ministers as well as for the manufacturers is the existence of a Fund for countercyclical measures endowed with 6.5 billions to be shared between the "Environment" and the PTT.

One single minister is really coming off well, Mr Yvon Bourges. Thanks to the law of military programming, scrupulously observed, his package increases by 23 percent in value and 12 percent in volume. It is the only notable exception to the austerity aimed for in public equipment expenditure.

An austerity compensated or followed by a recovery in private investments, Messrs Barre and Papon hope. The aid to investment scheme gives business the possibility to deduct 10 percent of its investment total from the taxable profits for 5 years, the most significant effort since the Liberation to revitalize business equipment.

Will business take advantage of it in the coming months? It might be necessary if we believe Mr Albert Merlin, director of studies at Saint Gobain-Pont-a-Mousse who notes a "squeezing of equipment expenditure since the spring".

But this is not certain. The effects of fiscal incentives on business accounts will only be noticeable in 1982. The experts of the Rue de Rivoli admit their inability to forecast the business reaction. In making their forecast they grandly ignored the consequences of this fiscal aid and announced a stagnation in volume of the industrial investments for next year. For Mr Jacques Plassard, Director of Rexecc "everything will depend on the context: if the final demand is limited investments will not flare up".

Private citizens are not forgotten by the tender care of the budget makers. With purchasing power unchanged the IRS will have no greater appetite for the French than last year. The first four brackets of the IRPP scale which affect 36 percent of the taxpayers are upgraded by 13.3 percent (the expected rate of price increases in 1980) and the following seven by 12 percent. Up to 270,000 francs of taxable income, tax pressure will not rise or will rise only a little for nearly all taxpayers. Only 100,000 of them (0.7 percent of the total) are hit by the increase limited to only 8 percent of the last bracket of the scale. Furthermore, the tax cut-off lines are raised and the 840,000 households with more than three children liable to taxing receive a gift: a half share of supplementary family quota. The cost to the budget will be a total of 13 billions. Mr Maurice Papon essentially respecting the tax freeze wanted by Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing harvests few new revenues: in the wake of Professor Jean Bernard's report on alcoholism, excise taxes on spirits and beer jump up and bring in 1.4 billion more. The recasting of petrol taxes brings in 1.3 billion and the raise in mining dues 650 millions.

Last aspect of this budget, that to which international financial circles are most sensitive, the size of the deficit. Mr Raymond Barre is just as stiff in this respect: the deficit announced is reduced: 29,4 billions, less than the amount announced and probably reached in 1980 (31 billions). Less than 1 percent of the GDP in 1981 against 1.3 percent this year, France consolidates its position as champion of budgetary restraint. In contrast to Germany which chose to live on credit: 110 billions of public deficit this year. This intentionally restrained level of deficit gives to the budget its deep significance. "It is a gesture which indicates the will of the State not to alter the impact of its action on the economy" estimates Mr Plassard.

What should we expect from a budget so ingeniously apportioned? The response of national analysts is not enthusiastic: 1.6 percent of GDP growth; a mean rate which hides the contrast between a spurt and a flat during the first semester, while a resurgence is scheduled to start again in mid year. The presidential election would therefore take place in the middle of the ford, right in the cyclical slump.

Sad outlook say the experts, but the politicians can hardly admit it. In presenting his budget Mr Maurice Papon "prayed" for 2.2 percent growth in 1981 with an upturn from the start of the year. The international situation, the results of the Fund for counter-cyclical action and of the tax aid to investment should, according to him, make the difference.

8696
CSO: 3100

PCF FAVORS CONSTRUCTION OF SEVENTH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE

Paris LE MATIN in French 5 Sep 80 p 2

[Article: "Defense: The PCF Calls for Independent Satellites"]

[Text] The PCF [French Communist Party] noted in the last issue of its bulletin ARMEE-NATION, its position on the matter of nuclear defense. It again came out for the construction of a seventh nuclear submarine and requested, furthermore, the putting into orbit of satellites susceptible to make the French submarine force "independent of foreign networks."

At a time when questions of defense are one of the topics under consideration by political parties, in the last issue of its bulletin, ARMEE-NATION, Jean Marrane, expert on defense questions, first requested the construction of a seventh nuclear missile-launching submarine.

This seventh craft should, in the opinion of the communist party, replace the "Redoutable," the first in the series of nuclear missile-launching submarines, whose construction began in 1971. At present France has five submarines of this type the latest of which, the "Tonnant," made its first cruise in May 1980. A sixth nuclear missile-launching submarine--the "Inflexible"--is scheduled to be launched in 1985. It will be outfitted with a new missile, the M-4, carrying six thermonuclear warheads. Subsequently, the other submarines should gradually be outfitted with M-4's. Only the "Redoutable" will continue to be equipped with its present missiles, the M-20's. In calling for the start of construction of a seventh submarine Jean Marrane noted that the PCF "is realistic without demogogy either vis-a-vis the top or the bottom when it places the stress today on the possession of six nuclear missile-launching submarines," excluding the "Redoutable."

Furthermore, the PCF calls for "the putting into orbit of the satellites necessary to make our submarine force truly independent of foreign systems." Already, in his report concerning nuclear armament in 1977, Jean Kanapa suggested the launching of three satellites "assigned to observation, localization, and transmission" for all French nuclear forces.

France now receives air defense and detection data from NATO which in the coming years is slated to build a more suitable satellite network. The PCF, by demanding an independent information network, thus again cautions against the possible reintegration of France into NATO [the military wing of NATO] by roundabout means.

2662
CSO: 3100

GENERAL LAGARDE RETIRES AS GROUND FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF

Paris LE MONDE in French 13 Sep p 25

[Article: "General Lagarde: My Departure from the General Staff of the Army Does Not Lend Itself to Any Special Interpretation"]

[Text] Caylus (Tarn-et-Garonne). "There is no ambiguity and there is no interpretation to be made regarding my departure from my duties as chief of staff of the Army as of 30 September at midnight." This was stated on Thursday 11 September, by Gen Jean Lagarde, who had come to the camp at Caylus to attend the mobilization maneuvers of the 111th Infantry Reserve Division, which is based on the 11th Parachute Division, stationed in southwestern France, in Corsica, and overseas.

Asked why he was retiring 6 months before reaching the age limit for his rank, the general stated: "For 5 years and 6 months I have been at the top position of the Army, which is the longest time since 1939, with one exception, that of Gen Emile Cantarel, who was chief of staff of the Army for 5 years and 11 months. I therefore consider myself a very happy man."

Recalling the appointment of his successor, Gen Jean-Yves Delaunay, without mentioning his name, the chief of staff of the Army declared, "So that the government can present the next military planning law to parliament in 1982, the general staffs must begin work to prepare it, starting with this winter. As far as that is concerned, it has always been anticipated that this would be the case. It is therefore reasonable and appropriate that the chief of the team which will undertake this preparatory work will also be the one which will have the responsibility for carrying it out."

Before going any further in this way into what he called, "the first of a thousand reasons," and, "the reason which, by itself, would be sufficient," for his early retirement, General Lagarde arranged to have presented one of the episodes in the mobilization maneuver of the 111th Infantry Division --the crossing of the Aveyron River by reservists who have been together since the beginning of the week. This unit has a strength of about 4300 men, one-quarter of whom are composed of reservists who performed their active military service in an airborne unit.

"Despite the resumption of school and social activity this fall, which is rather difficult this year," General Lagarde noted, "there will apparently be only 10 percent of the reservists missing." In reality, this evaluation should be qualified: If there is a slight shortage of enlisted men on hand, in terms of the number expected, there is a surplus of reserve officers who responded to the mobilization order, as if, for some, it were a matter of getting away from their daily routine as civilians, in this way.

Some reservists had to be sent home--81 out of 2637--for medical reasons. Colonel Cann, chief of staff of the 11th Parachute Division, explained, "they are senior officers or young men who no longer engage in physical training." Speaking more crudely of the "bay window" of certain reservists, General Lagarde said, "I have known more soldiers conquered by the demands of their body than by their enemy."

The chief of staff of the Army indicated that the draft defense budget for 1981 allocated F 62.8 million to the training of Army reserves, compared to F 40.2 million (in current value) for 1979. The number of training days for the reservists in the Army could go up from 180,000 in 1979 to 250,500 in 1981, if Parliament approves the appropriations bill.

To compensate reservists who, leaving thier jobs for the time being, could suffer from a shortage of purchasing power, the Ministry of Defense is proposing to Parliament for 1981 to pay each enlisted man mobilized, in addition to his salary, an increase of the daily compensatory rate from F 20 to F 55.

9170
CSO: 3100

ORGANIZATION, MATERIEL, MISSION OF INFANTRY

Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES in French Sep 80 p 17

[Errata to article by G. Turbe. The errata below refer to an article originally carried in the Paris DEFENSE INTERARMEES May-Jun 80 and published in JPRS 76240, 18 August 1980, No 1610 of this series pp 3-29]

[Text] The text below amends and completes the chapter in our study on the French infantry in 1980 devoted to the paratroop units (DEFENSE INTERARMEES No 49).

In contrast to what we announced at the time, the 11th Paratroop Division, too, has no longer been organized at the brigade level since 1979.

We are grateful to the army branch of the SIRPA [Information and Public Relations Department of the Armed Forces] which, through its observations, has enabled us to be accurate in the information that we provide.

11th Paratroop Division

The 11th Paratroop Division is designed for action in the air. Its units indeed have special aptitude to use helicopters but especially fixed-winged aircraft making possible parachute drops not to mention attack air transport.

Missions

1. Abroad

The 11th Paratroop Division is able to do the following:

a. To provide elements beefing up the forces stationed overseas for varying durations or to relieve them periodically in case of need; or

b. To intervene with all or a portion of its resources on all territories under French sovereignty, in foreign countries linked to France through defense agreements, or in any foreign theater of operations. On this score the 11th Paratroop Division acts within the framework of our Interservice External Forces.

2. In the European theater

The 11th Paratroop Division is a reserve force at the disposal of the CEA CEMG [Chief of the General Staff] who can place it globally or locally under the orders of

a. The territorial commander (at the level of the defense zone), or

b. The commanding general of the 1st Army.

In this context the commanding general of the 1st Army can use its capabilities to effect the following operations:

a. Decentralized operations in a zone, notably the rear;

b. Antitank operations against enemy armored thrusts;

c. "Commando"-type operations.

Whatever the framework of its use, the engagement of this large unit is characterized by its instantaneous nature. This aptitude for immediate action is carefully maintained by an alert system. Such capabilities is guaranteed by very great flexibility of the division's basic structures. The breakup or rapid consolidation of component units within the structures adapted to the requirements of the moment confers on the 11th Paratroop Division control over the most varied situations.

Organization

The purpose of this recent organization is to enhance the value of the External Operational Forces. It should especially be noted that an Airborne Group (GAP) was created in the 11th Paratroop Division. The GAP can place into immediate action up to two infantry regiments with support and backup.

Made up of 15,000 men, the 11th Paratroop Division includes the following:

1. One general staff;

2. One command and support paratroop regiment;

3. One Airborne Group consisting exclusively of volunteers and broken down into the following:

a. One general staff;

b. One command and backup paratroop battalion;

c. Three professionalized paratroop infantry regiments;

4. Four paratroop infantry regiments composed of draftees and volunteers; and

5. Six support and backup regiments.

2662
CSO: 3100

ZIONIST LEADER RESIGNS DUE TO CONFLICT WITH JEWISH COMMUNITY

Excerpts of Confidential Letter

Paris LE MATIN in French 3 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Shalom Cohen]

[Excerpts] The Zionist executive board is going to end the mission of the representative of the World Zionist Organization, Avi Primor, who arrived in Paris in August 1979. The decision was made last 14 July in Jerusalem during a meeting which had been kept secret until yesterday, according to our correspondent in Jerusalem, Shalom Cohen.

Did the Zionist executive board accede to a request made by the leaders of the Jewish community in France, in particular, Baron Guy de Rothschild, the chairman of the United Jewish Social Fund, which had been opposed for several months to the strategy developed in France by Primor?

The quarrel between the representative of the Zionist organization and the leaders of the French Jewish community had come to a head a few weeks earlier when Primor had sent to Jerusalem a confidential report, which our correspondent learned of, attacking its adversaries severely, accusing them of "anti-Zionism." In Paris, Avi Primor pointed out in LE MATIN that, after the revewal of his mission in France at the beginning of the summer, he had been informed this week that he was being promoted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he had just been named to the post of chief of the Western European desk. But, if he had challenged certain terms in the translation of the text, he has nevertheless confirmed its existence.

It was in the confidential letter sent on last 16 May to Arieh Dulzin, the chairman of the World Zionist Organization in Jerusalem, that Avi Primor drew up a list of his complaints against the leaders who traditionally lead the Jewish community in France, in the hope, now abandoned, of victoriously crowning the offensive which he had been leading for several months against them.

This 9-page document, in Hebrew, was to be the partial report on the mission which he had begun 9 months earlier, when he went to Paris as the representative of the World Zionist Organization. It was also a fierce attack against the action taken in France by these leaders and against the ideas, which they defend, of a Jewish presence abroad. Along with this, Primor was deliberately and enthusiastically supporting the Zionist Jewish Renewal movement, which is chaired by the Parisian lawyer, Henri Hajdenberg, who for several years has been leading the offensive against the Rothschild family by defending a much more aggressive idea of French Judaism.

"We have almost no ties with French Judaism," stated Primor in his letter. We must seek out and create instruments which permit us to establish an organizational framework for this Judaism. Those are the conditions necessary to bring about fundamental changes."

For Primor, the struggle in France being led against the traditional leaders "is a permanent struggle, which has ideological causes." "The result of this struggle," he continued, "will shape in the long run the image of the Jewish community in France and especially the influence of Zionism and of the state of Israel on that community. The most important Jewish organization which has the most power in organized Judaism here and which has an efficient staff is the United Jewish Social Fund, operating under the orders of its chairman, Guy de Rothschild, and of its secretary general Adam Loss. Both have a common attitude toward Zionism and Israel. They are both anti-Zionists...."

"It is obvious," added Primor, "that the Social Fund cannot openly manifest the ideology of its leaders. The Social Fund relies on the money it raises from donations and knows full well that the bulk of its money comes from people who believe that the state of Israel needs it. Rothschild and Loss must therefore be careful if they do not want to cut off the branch on which they are sitting. They know the road is long and, consequently, they engage in all sorts of maneuvers to camouflage their principles and real intentions. When I arrived in France, the leaders of the Social Fund thought that my analysis of the situation as well as my mission were not realistic. They adopted a cautious line, thinking nothing would come out of it and that, after a few months, I would go back to Jerusalem. Realizing that the reorganization of the Zionist movement was progressing, they became worried and began to fight. The first salvo was fired in the form of an editorial article by Loss in L'ARCHE. I do not think that there have been any articles as serious in the Western non-communist Jewish press since the creation of the state of Israel."

"The effort to separate the Jewish community of France from the state of Israel," explained Primor, "comes not only from the ideology of the author, but from a feeling that there are actually seeds of Zionism among the Jews in France and that they must not be allowed to prosper. From that point on, the struggle has not ceased, through the intermediary of the press of the Social Fund, personally directed by Adam Loss."

Reaction, Implications

Paris LE MATIN in French 4 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Maurice Szafran]

[Excerpts] In a few weeks, Avi Primor, the delegate to Paris of the World Zionist Organization, will return to the offices of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the heart of the old city of Jerusalem. On that date, the "Primor Affair" will be officially closed and, apparently, the Jewish community of France will no longer be periodically shaken by shouts, squabbles, major or minor crises. "My forthcoming return to Israel," Avi Primor explains, "is not a recall. The Ministry sounded me out about taking on important tasks. And I accepted."

The Israeli diplomat claims he is not being punished. Quite to the contrary, he says he is being given an unexpected and flattering promotion, one that no ambitious public servant could refuse. Nevertheless, the "quiet" withdrawal of Avi Primor cannot erase the political context in which, whether there is a coincidence or not, it is taking place.

In circles close to Baron Guy de Rothschild, the chairman of the United Jewish Social Fund, all they will say is that the "principle leaders will say nothing, since there have been enough polemics disturbing the community." Still, they cannot resist pointing out unofficially that the departure of Avi Primor will most likely ease future relations between the French diaspora and Israeli leaders. A modest triumph, but an analysis which confirms the growing desire for independence on the part of the local leaders of the Jewish community regarding Israel, its policies, its methods. "The Primor Report? It is typically Israeli," is the analysis of a Jewish university professor close to these questions. "It is straight-forward, direct, lacking in nuance." Did Avi Primor become the object, personally, of a consensus against him that some thought impossible, that of the large majority of the organized Jewish community?

Probably. And the meetings which have taken place in Jerusalem at the beginning of the summer confirm in part that hypothesis. During the general assemblies of the Jewish agency and of the Zionist Action Committee, a kind of world Jewish parliament, discreet meetings, even secret ones, had for their theme the French situation and the action of Avi Primor. It brought together French and Israeli delegates.

The French, of no matter what faction, lashed out against Primor and criticized his methods, his authoritarianism, his attempt to interfere in strictly political French problems and, finally, not limiting his activities primarily to the immigration of the Jewish population to Israel, which was supposed to have been his role. A conflict of ideas, certainly, but also a personality conflict.

Whatever the case, the Israelis and the French had reached an agreement. Primor would remain in his job for one more year: his explosive report was swept under the rug and, in particular, he was given special instructions not to rile in the future the leaders of French Judaism and Guy de Rothschild in particular. The truce lasted, it seems, only 2 months.

A week before the Jewish New Year holy day, a declaration in LE MATIN by Serge Hajdenberg, the chairman of the Jewish Renewal, the movement which organized the last "Twelve Hours For Israel," added to the confusion and rekindled the debate: "There are people who have done their utmost to make sure that Primor does not stay. In the Jewish community, there is an anti-Zionist faction. It holds the power and will not let go. It has won that round, but it has shown that it is badly weakened.

"We are going to continue to fight. Some people clearly always want to have complete control of the community."

The Jewish Renewal was receiving the active support of Avi Primor. The delegate of the World Zionist Organization saw in him the instrument and the means to transform to some extent French Judaism. What does the Renewal mean to the Jewish population? "Nothing," affirm most of the leaders of the community. Nevertheless, this time, openly, and seriously accused by Serge Hadjenberg, they will have to answer and explain themselves. Primor or no Primor.

8956
CSO: 3100

LIKE ATTITUDE, LANGUAGE, CULTURE CREATE STRONG BOND WITH LEBANON

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Rene Habchi: "Amorous Grudge or Friendly Defiance?"]

[Text] Speaking before the International Academy of Diplomacy, Boutros Dib, ambassador of Lebanon in Paris, recently denounced the misinformed who seem to forget that the great majority of Lebanese are not considering dividing their territory. Moslems and Christians throughout their history have spoken for their independence and their unity, and they hold on to these today as they did yesterday. So, this majority is reluctantly suffering the delay imposed on the return to order and government. The majority would not hesitate to show its thirst for law and government if it were not for a conspiracy of artful officials who fear they will lose their power the moment they lay down their arms. Tolerance, the ambassador recalls, "is an integral part of our secular traditions. National reunification exists in our souls and hearts, as well as the desire to resume a brotherly coexistence whose form is enriched by the teachings of a costly experience."

The traveller returning from Beirut realizes that these truths, while they are everywhere, are thwarted by the irrationality of the situation. It is then that one nostalgically asks: "Has France done all it could?"

Why France? Because the history of France and Lebanon is a love story. Since the crusaders dreamed of settling the coasts of the East, there has been a harmony of attitude, language and culture between the two countries which the joint enticements of the United States and Russia have not been able to neutralize.

France, in line with its historical generosity, would understand that no resource put at the service of Lebanon would be lost. Lebanon is still the door to the Middle East. The businesses which have tried to settle elsewhere have returned, and Lebanese experts forced to emigrate to other Arab countries are helping to spread the network of French industrial interests that already bound them. I know some who, from Paris, are organizing ready-to-wear stores in Kuwait and the emirates. In their own way, they are the best ambassadors of French progress in the Arab countries. And finally, which Arab-speaking country has embraced French like a second nature and whose writers are known in the Arab world as well as in the West?

France could answer that it has not stopped insisting on Lebanon's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. It has done more. Mr Couve de Murville's mission, extended by those of Messrs Gorse and Robin, has pro en this with their project of a Lebanese "round-table" outside Lebanese territory. Have reporters not guessed that Mr Arafat's wish to be received at the Elysee was wrapped up by the retreat of Palestinian forces into their camps in Lebanon, according to the 1969 Cairo agreements?

Nevertheless, however intelligent they may be, aren't these interventions elusive and preventive? To which can be answered: "But still, to what wishes of the Lebanese officials has France remained deaf?"

France is not expected to take a position on the ground and we can only appreciate its participation in the international force, the FINUL [expansion unknown]. But when a knot is so tight that any attempt to undo it increases the tension, the only thing left to do is to loosen both ends of the string. Is bending Syria, the Palestinians, and to a certain measure, the USSR and the United States, out of reach for France?

France has demonstrated its support for the Arabs--and that it profits from this is not enough to suspect it of a determinism based on economic interests. History has permitted it, more than any other nation, to understand its interlocutors. President Giscard d'Estaing's visits to Kuwait and Jordan show an important similarity of views. Finally, France allows the Arabs to be heard through it by Europe.

Previously, France had already received Syrian president El-Assad and taken note of his assurance that he had no other aim for Lebanon than to save its unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Couldn't France now prevail upon the Arab States and especially Syria to give up their vilifying and divisive influence on Lebanon?

Regarding the Palestinians, hasn't France quite frankly supported their legitimate rights in order to obtain their retreat from South Lebanon, thus eliminating any excuse for Israeli incursions? The walls of Beaufort castle, respected by history, have just succombed to the attacks of Israeli air force. Isn't this a piece of France collapsing in the East? What can be said about South Lebanon, whose inhabitants are swept away in the Palestinian-Israeli cross-fire?

In addition, French policy has moved away somewhat from the United States, and the meeting with Brezhnev restoring detente after the invasion of Afghanistan adjusts France's original position between the two blocs. It knows how devastating he Kissinger plan is for the Near East. A mosaic of parochial states devoted to better set in a Jewish state among small Moslem, "druze" and Christian countries, would condemn all of them to be swallowed sooner or later by the Arab-Moslem tide. Israel would show intelligence by accepting to be inserted into the region at the cost of recognizing a Palestinian state...whereas Begin missed the boat which Sadat offered him at the Knesset, turning into a failure an initiative which, had it been followed by immediate actions, would have furnished the key to a durable peace in the Near East.

Loosening the Vise

France's balanced position between the United States and the USSR should lead to more radical results than the declaration of Venice, and finally loosen the vise which strangles a small country that is tired of proclaiming its will to live. Lebanon's president has a healthy political, cultural and economic plan for the country, but he knows full well that announcing it prematurely would kill its chances unless it were previously approved democratically by those involved.

Who in Lebanon would think of questioning the Arabness which President Takyed-dine El Solh set forth in his recent statement as one of the three basic elements of a Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian organization, when Arabness is a component of Lebanon's Mediterranean character?

France is finally paying attention to the Mediterranean reality. The idea of a "trilogue" is starting to circulate in official reports. Trilogue among Europeans, Arabs and French-speaking negroes which, respecting the uniqueness of each, would feed their complementarity around and by means of that "interior sea."

It remains to remind the Arabs who would still distrust the Mediterranean concept that it is Europe which is of the Mediterranean and not the Mediterranean which belongs to Europe. As for the Arabs, they only have to remember the Damascus of the Umayyads, the Baghdad of the Abbasids and the Andalusian Cordova, to enumerate the Greek, Jewish and Christian riches which woven with Islam have made it vital and perhaps show it the path to a creative revival. As for the French-speaking negroes, their opening toward the Mediterranean, prefigured by the Almoravids in Spain, offers them outlets which can only strengthen the vigor of their land by irrigating it with modernism.

Human conflicts are solved in the horizontality of our greedy and narrow-minded interests only at the price of sacrifices and mutilations. A living solution can only be found in a vertical synthesis that goes beyond them and wraps them up. Mediterranean cooperation is apt to lead to this synthesis which Lebanon needs, like all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, and which, in our view, could give the world a human and universal perspective the lack of which is plaguing it today.

It is so true that to speak of Lebanon is always to speak of the universal. It is not for nothing that Lebanon is "that real museum of man's history where chronology begins with the dawn of history." (B. Dib) Perhaps its precious fragility will provide an opportunity for France to show that, as de Gaulle said in his memoirs, "France cannot be without greatness." I do not believe that these words, so well known by the French, can seem out of date. I recall them here because Lebanon's disappointed admission is not only an amorous grudge but above all a friendly defiance.

9341
CSO: 3100

INTERIOR MINISTER ROGNONI INTERVIEWED ON TERRORISM

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 15 Sep 80 pp 46-47

[Interview with Minister of the Interior Virginio Rognoni, by Fabrizio Coisson: "Coming Out of the Tunnel"]

> [Text] Virginio Rognoni is optimistic. The reconstituted secret services are functioning, the police and carabinieri are able to perform their tasks, international conspiracies are about to be thwarted. But the questions still go unanswered.

The secret services? They're working extremely well. Their loyalty to democracy? Absolute. International terrorist affiliations? This is a problem that primarily concerns the Ministry of Defense. Procrastination in the fight against b'ack [neo-Fascist] sedition? Absolutely none. The overall state of public order in Italy? Definitely improving.

Resolute, tough, controversial, Virginio Rognoni, minister of the interior, rejects all accusations leveled against him over the past few weeks by various political sectors, particularly the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Indeed, in this replies to PANORAMA's questions, he counterattacks.

[Question] The Bologna massacre and the most recent assassination perpetrated by the NAR (Armed Revolutionary Nuclei] in Rome have fueled a raging controversy over the minister of the interior. Too little is known about terrorism; there's no coordinated plan of action against subversion; the structures were antiquated.... Even Bettino Craxi, secretary of the PSI, a party in the government, is saying these things openly.

[Answer] There's no basis for such charges. If we knew everything about terrorism, certainly we'd be rid of it by now. But in all fairness, we must acknowledge the fact that we know much more about it today than we did yesterday. The results achieved through our investigations over the past few years have revealed so much about this cursed reality that we can now combat it with greater efficiency.

[illegible] Even with so many outworn, inefficient structures?

[Answer] The structures have been, or are being, renewed. This operation is complicated, for one reason because the fight against terrorism allows us the time to [illegible] at our convenience. The police reform, which the Chamber approved by a large majority, shows what we have been able to do in this direction.

[Question] The secret services have also been reformed, yet one has the impression that only their acronyms have been changed. To a great extent, the men working in the services are the same as those they employed during the years of the strategy of tension.

[Answer] That's not exact. In the information services, especially SISDE [Democratic Security Information Service] after that much-discussed moment everyone knows about, there has been a thorough renewal, not only in the organizational and operational structures but also largely in the personnel, in view of their dependence on the political power and considering the men employed by them, today these services are giving the utmost guarantees of constitutional fidelity. They are agencies of a democratic state in defense of the democratic state.

[Question] Various episodes (the Russomanno case, for example) leave a number of questions unresolved. Now people are asking other questions concerning the news leaks about the inquiry into the carnage in Bologna. It's said that these new leaks are filtering out of Rome.

[Answer] The [proper] reaction to the news stories churned out by the press, which lack the minimum respect for the responsibilities of the secret investigations, for official and professional secrets, should be a very harsh one. Apart from the investigations into those responsible, in end must be put to a practice which panders to a society gnawed by suspicions but affords a democratic and state governed by law, with its seats of serious debate and control. Otherwise, the inevitable results would be shortsighted, disguised protests and a cynical moral abdication by a fed-up population.

[Question] Yet, the suspicions are not easily laid to rest.

[Answer] And they spread anxieties which, in turn, feed more suspicions. In fact at best, everyone considers himself protagonist and savior in a befuddled jump to conclusions and [false] evaluations, which don't do anything for anyone.

[Question] But some control by public opinion must exist.

[Answer] On other occasions I have spoken about defeating terrorism as a sort of question of prejudice, against which we must all measure ourselves. As for the government's efforts, it is only right to ask for public opinion to check up on them so that nothing is overlooked and everything is

done with rigorous precision. To this I must add that every individual should feel it his duty to observe the same rigor and seriousness he demands from others.

[Question] Are you alluding to the recent disputes?

[Answer] Criticism is useful, but certainly not preconcieved animosities or the game of playing fast and loose with problems and realities. To confront them squarely, we must all play the same role together.

[Question] One current criticism is extremely severe: that black terrorism has been underestimated. Do you accept this accusation?

[Answer] It's not true. What's true, if anything, is that in the recent past the external manifestations of that phenomenon and its geographical dimensions have been less extensive than those of its parallel phenomenon, red terrorism. But the ministry and the police don't apply different standards of scrutiny to the different stripes of terrorism.

[Question] One fact, however, is sure. Before the Bologna massacre, no alert, preventive action was taken. Is there something or someone who can guarantee that such a disaster will not occur again?

[Answer] Any act of terrorism is unexpected and unpredictable. That's why the secret services play a crucial part in our campaign against terrorists. Every effort, therefore, must be concentrated on them and on determining the most urgent direction to follow toward strengthening their efficiency and professional status. This means a scrupulous, complex and probably lengthy action. I can say one thing, however, with absolute certainty. In the Bologna affair, as with every terroristic deed whether black or red, the [public] demand for the true facts and for justice finds the state apparatus committed to the hilt.

[Question] Yet even after the recent arrests of neo-Fascist extremists suspected of complicity in the Bologna massacre, people are still puzzled. Some talk of a "black 7 April" (paralleling the case of Tony Negri, accused at first of the Moro kidnapping). Again, questions about the obscure part played by certain sectors of the state apparatus have come to the surface.

[Answer] I denounce as unjust and most dangerous the fact that with every Fascist act of terrorism, as in the tragic case of Bologna, some people can do no better than to call it a "massacre by the state."

[Question] The Bologna catastrophe has once again posed the question of an international network of terrorism. Here, too, the socialists (and others) maintain that your answer to it is still at the zero point.

[Answer] On the matter of international collaboration in terrorism, which has been so much talked about, we've joined the other EEC countries (and non-EEC countries as well) in an institutional system of mutual cooperation

for a thorough exchange of information on a problem obviously of common concern. This concern and solidarity in amassing data limit one country's privileged position over another's and, conversely, leave no participating country neglected.

[Question] In other words, you're saying that Italy no longer lags behind the other nations in gathering the facts on international terrorist affiliations. But truthfully, are there no gaps in this area?

[Answer] By rights we must expect the competent service to give its maximum initiative to this problem (the "competent service," according to Rognoni, is SISMI [Military Information Security Service], dependent, however, on the Minister of Defense, the Socialist Lelio Lagorio--editor's note).

[Question] On the whole, you give an almost optimistic picture of the situation.

[Answer] I don't think we can negate the recent advances made in the struggle against the terrorist organization--I mean, in breaking up their internal structures. But the field is evidently broader because it also involves the mafia, kidnapings, the drug traffic, criminal and paracriminal groups, which operate under cover for the worst atrocities. Long, patient work has begun to produce significant results against the mafia and the drug traffic.

[Question] Do you suppose you could do your job better with special laws or capital punishment? Or are the present laws adequate?

[Answer] The job of a minister of the interior in a democratic state requires great faith in the capacity of a democracy to know itself and to be able to defend itself without pause, therefore to be a democracy. I don't believe that special laws or capital punishment would be effective deterrents. I believe rather in efficiency, in a fully professional police force, in speedy trials, in the certainty of punishment, in serious investigations, in recovering civil and moral values, in the rigor and severity of collective and personal behavior. I insist: the problem lies in applying the laws we already have, therefore to intervene in good time by holding trials and be establishing the identity of those guilty of the outrages which so deeply dismay the population.

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CSO: 3104

SURINAMERS KEEP COMING DESPITE VISA REQUIREMENT

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 6 Sep 80 pp 26, 27

[Article by Sig W. Wolf: "Despite Visa Requirement There Is Still a Massive Influx of Surinamers"]

> [Text] Visa or no visa, the Surinamers will continue to come, to the grief of the Suriname government, which is fighting a gigantic shortage of middle-level staff and technical people, and to the great concern of the Netherlands, where the Surinamers immigrant can expect housing difficulties and unemployment and where there is scarcely any proper reception to speak of.

Last week there was pushing and shoving in front of the building of the consular department of the Netherlands Embassy in Lim A Po Street in Paramaribo. In this high-priced street, where most businesses are law offices, notaries public and a few engineering bureaus, the one-way traffic wrestled through the multitude with difficulty. Hundreds of men, women and children, many of whom were already there by 0500, pressed towards the narrow door of the consulate with only one goal in sight: a visa for the Netherlands.

Since the Netherlands instituted a visa requirement for Surinamers wanting to travel to the promised land at the beginning of this week, conditions have been chaotic. Papers have to be filled out by people who can hardly read or write. Many applicants turn out not to be able to put up the required 1,000 guilders for adults and 500 guilders for children for a 1 month stay. The purpose of travel alleged by many, a tourist trip, sounds so incredible that consular officials who had been going along tongue-in-cheek to that point have to laugh. They do know better. The "suspicious" applications are put at the bottom of the list.

The means of defense that the Netherlands suddenly launched to inhibit the influx of Surinamers will hardly be effective, anyway. The Surinamers continue to flee their country in order to gain a foothold in the "promised land" before 25 November. On that date the flexible regulation for residence and settlement runs out.

A wave of indignation broke loose in Suriname and among Surinamers in the Netherlands last week when Secretary of State Haars of justice announced that there had to be an end to these Surinamese "fugitives." On Suriname's independence day, now nearly 5 years ago, three treaties were concluded between the Netherlands and Suriname, one for the conditions for residence and settlement of Surinamers in the Netherlands, one to regulate nationality and one about not requiring a visa. The Dutch government ended that last treaty on 1 September, a unilateral step, which was expressly permitted in the treaty.

The Dutch government had urgent reasons to institute the visa requirement. Developments in the migration from Suriname over the past 2 years worried the Hague. The first half of this year, emigration assumed catastrophic proportions for Suriname. According to figures from CRM [the Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Welfare] about 2,000 Surinamers for whom there was no work, housing or good reception came to our country per month. There are now already 180,000 Surinamese in the Netherlands, while in the country itself there are only 347,000 left, of whom 30,000 are foreigners, primarily Guyanese.

In fact, Suriname is happy with this unilateral measure. They had to look on sadly as the best forces pulled out. It was particularly the middle level staff and technical people who felt that they had seen everything worth seeing in Suriname. In the departments and in industry, people are tearing at their hair.

The indignation in Suriname circles, then, does not apply so much to the content as to the manner in which the visa requirement was introduced. Vice-Premier Andre Haakmat spoke of a horse tonic that will provide no fundamental solution to the withdrawal of Suriname's labor potential. Haakmat was upset because the Netherlands had simply put Suriname on the spot with its unilateral announcement of the visa requirement. The government in Paramaribo was informed of the Dutch plans through diplomatic channels about a month ago. They went along with that in Paramaribo, on the condition that the agreements on settlement and nationality were included in the discussion. The Netherlands did not agree to that. The Hague stated that it was only willing to negotiate if Suriname were to cooperate in announcing the visa requirement shortly. Paramaribo did not favor that and refused to agree. When it leaked out last week from a confidential discussion between Secretary of State Haars and Minister Van Der Klaauw of foreign affairs and the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Justice [of the Second Chamber], that a visa regulation was in the works, the Hague had no choice but for this government to make the announcement unilaterally as of 1 September.

For that matter, the desire for a visa for Surinamers is a matter that has been on the back burner for years. From January 1976 on the Hague has attempted to discuss a package for damming up the Surinamese emigration with one Suriname government after another. Premier Arron of Suriname had no

ear for that. He acted as though there were nothing going on and rejected the escape of his countrymen with the remark: "I don't know anything about a massive flight. I have never been to the Zanderije Airport to count my emigrating countrymen." But even if Arron had made the effort to go to the airport, he would still have gotten a false impression. Thousands of his countrymen who entered the Netherlands with a round-trip ticket in their pockets proved to have no difficulty at all in letting their return tickets expire and remaining here. They made use of the much-too-flexible residence and settlement regulation.

Furthermore, the content of that regulation has scarcely been changed. The settlement provisions, in which the reuniting of families is the major standard, are still in force. Every Surinamer (after all, one in three already lives in the Netherlands) certainly has one family member or another living in the Netherlands. The very prevalent Suriname family situation (which is recognized by the Netherlands) in which one mother has children by many fathers is a contributing factor.

Furthermore, experience in other countries, including England, has shown that the requirement for a visa awakes the expectation that many good things can be expected on the other side of the line. The great danger that now threatens is that the hunt will begin for illegal Surinamers, like the one that is now going on for other illegal aliens. The National Federation of Suriname Welfare Institutions has already warned against such investigations. According to the director, Dr Harold Roseval, requiring a visa is a misleading step, because it creates the impression that something is being done to limit the entry of Surinamers. "The actual intention behind this measure is to trace the people who stay longer than is permitted.

6940
CSO: 3105

MILITARY USES 'NEW TONE' IN OPEN CRITICISM OF LABOR LAW

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Military Grumbles"]

[Text] There is dissatisfaction among the Defense Forces. The recent negotiation and meetings have brought a new tone into the debate; a tone that has been unknown in defense circles up to now. A professional group, which for years has accepted their rather special working conditions without objecting, is now ready to shed their layer of good nature, which up to now has kept the military from sharp words, strong attacks and actions.

But now comes the outburst. The restrained dissatisfaction with the working conditions, which probably are quite special and not to the military's advantage when compared to the conditions in the civilian sector in other respects, manifests itself in strong demands for quick changes. This applies both to the military system and the conditions that are regulated by the working conditions law.

Earlier, the Defense Forces were exempt from regulations that applied to ordinary employees. The employee protection law was an unknown concept to the military. But now--in principle it was decided long ago--the military will be subject to the working conditions law with regard to working hours, overtime, etc., among other things. This will unavoidably create some disagreement.

The military must, and obviously will, accept the fact that they operate a very special institution which does not allow working conditions enjoyed by employees in an ordinary company. The leadership of the Defense Forces, the military and the political, must--and will--accept that the military also will gradually plan, as much as possible, to obtain working conditions applicable to the civilian sector, with the exceptions resulting from the special type of service. There is no disagreement on these points. There may, however, be quarrels about the consequences. Their quarrels will be about how much it will cost to implement the working conditions law and about the cost of new working places. These consequences should be discussed immediately with a quick clarification in mind.

The military system is another battle theme. In this respect there is also an agreement on the need for revision, but disagreement about the content goes so deep, that a change seems impossible in the near future. The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions interprets the presentation from the leadership of the Defense Forces to mean that the hope for quick revision seems buried. At that, this suggestion can hardly serve as any particularly fruitful basis for further discussions.

We are left with a definite impression that the military, on all levels and to the highest degree, is willing to comply with the one important main consideration, namely that working conditions and the military system at any given time must be the main concerns, so that the Defense Forces will not be weakened, and that the preparedness will be maintained. In that case both sides must be able to straighten out the disagreement among themselves, so that the disagreement supported by irritation and dissatisfaction, does not imply weakening preparedness capabilities.

The impression is also that in general the military is dissatisfied with the Defense Force leadership. In that event it is very serious state of affairs. This is where the two sides should come together and speak up before causing dissatisfaction that really shakes the very defense that much time is given to maintaining and is continually being improved.

9583
CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

BOURGEOIS PARTIES' VICTORY CHANCE--In a close situation, joint nonsocialist party lists in "proper" districts may be the deciding factor for nonsocialist election victory next year. Realistic combinations of lists would yield considerable gain. If the election result will be approximately the parties' average support, as it was for the second quarter of this year, the calculations AFTENPOSTEN has made show that the nonsocialist majority without joint party lists will be approximately 81-74. With joint party lists in Hedmark, Telemark, Ostfold, Hordaland, Vest-Agder, Nordland and Sor-Trondelag, the nonsocialist majority could in any case be 87-69, that is to say a majority of 19. With a realistic evaluation of the election prospects, the possibilities the joint party lists should have for mandate victory--or to prevent nonsocialistic losses--should play an important role in the deliberations that are taking place among the nonsocialistic parties. The reason for the need to use joint party lists is, that we have an unjust election system which does not secure the one party representation in the parliament, in relation to the party's size. A hypothetical example shows this. The election district is to elect five members to parliament: A. 70,000 4; B. 29,500 1; C. 13,500 0; D. 13,500 0; E. 13,500 0. In this case, A gets 80 percent of the representatives with 50 percent of the votes. In this instance, joint party lists would reduce A's over-representation. When the Labor Party opposes a just election system, joint party lists, therefore, are the natural response. Districts where nonsocialist parties can secure the mandate increase during the election next fall are the following. [Excerpt] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 6 Sep 80 p 3] 9583

CSO: 3108

DANISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS' DEFENSE POLICY, UNION RELATIONS VIEWED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Will Denmark hold elections again just one year after the last elections! This is not totally impossible. If so, it could be because of such an unlikely topic as defense. This was indicated by Anker Jorgensen, prime minister and party leader, at the Danish Social Democratic Congress, which closed last Sunday.

The Danish Social Democrats want Denmark to keep defense expenditures at the present level and not approve a 3 percent real increase, agreed upon by the Western defense alliance NATO. Something concrete must be done to hold back on armaments, Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen said at the congress and received great applause.

Among the other parties, it is primarily the Radical Liberals, the leftist liberal party that is traditionally critical of defense, that could join the Social Democrats. Even if these two are not sufficient to form a majority, it is still probably that the side advocating savings will win in the end, despite stiff opposition from the non-socialist parties that are working together--the Conservative and Liberal Parties.

The United States, for its part, is not satisfied. It is now threatening to demand weapons stockpiles in Denmark in the same manner as in Norway, which is in the midst of a lively debate over how and where the stockpiles should be located.

By taking over the new position of organizational vice chairman, the left wing of the party can now get a hold on contacts with the local party associations. But there is no deep schism within the party. Anker's position is strong. He seems to be more popular the more taxes he proposes.

The Social Democrats' big problem is their relationship to LO (Danish Federation of Trade Unions). To be sure, LO has approved this year's 5 percent decrease in real wages but at the congress LO chairman Thomas Nielsen was

sharply critical of the Social Democratic government's economic policy, based on the so-called Easter agreement of last year with three minor parties. Tax increases by around 5 billion kroner, which will be invested in the economy this fall, and cutbacks in the growth of the public sector were included in the "Easter compromise."

A certain effect from this restraint can be noted. Imports and consumption have been reduced somewhat but it is still too early to state that Denmark has begun to come out of the economic crisis.

Anker Jorgensen says that a continued drop in real wages can hardly be avoided, perhaps by up to 2 percent per year for the next 3 years. LO is protesting but has little to suggest instead of this. The right wing wants to reduce public expenditures even more.

The Social Democratic minority government continues to sail between the political reefs. "Iron-Anker" Jorgensen must live up to his name if he is to steer Denmark through the storm of overconsumption.

9336
CSO: 3109

COMMENTATOR DISCUSSES PROBABLE CONFIDENCE TEST FOR CABINET

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Sep 80 p 2

[Commentary by Sven Svensson]

[Text] Stay in power at any price, even if this means going back on election promises. This has been the watchword of all the governments throughout the 1970's, the first decade of the single-chamber parliament. The result has been an erosion of governmental authority and a weakening of the parliamentary system of government.

When the single-chamber parliament was pushed through in 1968, the main idea was for the voters to be sovereign on election day. The election results were to be reflected immediately in the formation of the cabinet and in this way the parliamentary system was to be strengthened.

Ten years' experience with the single-chamber parliament points to a weakening of governmental authority, a stricter division into blocks, and frequent betrayal of both party programs and election promises.

The division into a nonsocialist and a socialist block could be discerned already in the first election for the single-chamber parliament in the fall of 1970. The Social Democrats and the Farmers Alliance/Center Party had long cooperated in various forms but during the campaign Center Party leader Gunnar Hedland chose the nonsocialist block. Palme and Hedlund got into a violent argument in which Palme promised that the campaign would "take care" of Hedlund.

Blocks Strengthened

Palme was able to hang on to power despite an election defeat but during the fall of 1971 the block structure was reinforced. Thorbjorn Falldin had become Center Party leader. In November 1971 the three nonsocialist party leaders held a common press conference for the first time at which they demanded lowered value added tax and lowered employer payroll taxes to decrease unemployment.

The nonsocialists were ecstatic. The expectation of a change in government was strengthened.

A year later, in 1973, the Social Democrats entered another deep political crisis. The government proposed a tax reform, which was to be financed by an increase in the value added tax.

However, the three nonsocialist opposition parties rejected the increase in the value added tax, as did the VPK (Left Party Communists) and, since the Social Democrats did not have a majority on their own, a governmental crisis threatened. The Social Democrats made an about-face and accepted the VPK proposal for an increase in the employer payroll tax instead of an increase in the value added tax to avoid resigning. The Palme government was saved.

Lottery Parliament

In the 1973 election, Palme slipped further and the result was the historic lottery parliament with the blocks evenly divided at 175 to 175.

A new serious crisis arose in 1974. Gunnar Helen and Thorbjorn Falldin wanted to reduce the value-added tax temporarily from 15 to 10 percent to increase employment following the oil crisis. Gosta Bohman later joined them.

Good advice was costly for Palme. The Social Democrats were against the reduced value-added tax but they compromised rather than jeopardize the existence of the government. The result was a 3 percent decrease in the value added tax for 6 months. Later, the Haga agreements followed in rapid succession, as did the defeats in the lottery. But the government remained.

In 1976, Palme was at the end of his rope. In the election there was a clear majority for the three nonsocialist parties, which were divided in many important questions, such as nuclear power, childcare, and taxes.

But there had to be a nonsocialist three-party government regardless of their varying opinions after the 44 year Social Democratic power monopoly. Better to go back on campaign promises than be outside the government, was their motto.

The compromise on nuclear power was dishonest from the very beginning. By 1978 the Falldin government, quite logically, had been worn down by internal disputes.

In 1978, with the blessing of the Social Democrats, the Ullsten government was formed. The primary tasks were to solve the energy problem in a manner capable of gaining broad support and to carry out a tax reform for 1979.

The question of nuclear power was to be answered by way of an agreement among Social Democrats, Liberals, and Conservatives in favor of 12 nuclear power plants. In the tax question, the Center Party made trouble because the Liberal Party's figures in the polls were climbing rapidly.

When the nuclear power question was to come to a vote in parliament, the reactor accident at Harrisburg occurred. Palme made his complete about-face of "crazy Wednesday" and suddenly wanted a referendum.

Ullsten accepted the slap in the face and continued as though nothing had happened.

Center Loss

In the 1979 election the Center Party suffered a major defeat, losing as many percentage points as the Liberal Party lost tenths of a point. The Ullsten government resigned nevertheless and the Falldin government returned in its place, contrary to parliamentary principles.

That a clear majority of the people voted against the Center's policy in the nuclear power question had no parliamentary significance, nor did the defeat in parliament over the shipbuilding question and others.

The trend during the 1970's is clear. Rather than put their existence in jeopardy by calling for a vote of confidence in parliament the parties in power capitulated even if this went against campaign promises or election platforms.

This is true of Social Democratic and nonsocialist governments, majority and minority governments alike.

In 1972 the Palme government could have kept to its proposal for an increase in the value-added tax to finance the tax reform. It would have been interesting to see if the VPK would have really voted against the Social Democrats' proposal, considering the threat of a new election.

It was easier and more inoffensive for the Social Democrats to make a turnabout and accept the VPK proposal for an increase in the employer payroll tax.

The same is true of the nonsocialist opposition's demand for a decrease in the value-added tax in 1974. There was nothing to prevent the Social Democratic government from appealing to the people in a new election after losing a vote in parliament. However, it was simpler and easier to compromise than to maintain previous convictions.

Liberal Regime Without Foundation

The Liberal Party government would have had good reason to resign after the Social Democrats went back on their agreement following the reactor accident at Harrisburg. Much of the basis for the existence of the Liberal Party government had been taken away.

The same is true of the tax question. Here Ullsten could have given parliament a choice. Accept my proposal or I will resign several months before the scheduled election and then you can try to solve the tax problem, Ullsten could have said.

The result would certainly have been that the Center Party would have been forced to join ranks behind the Liberal Party. This was, incidentally, what happened in the 1979 election campaign.

Now the question is being widely discussed of whether the Social Democrats, when the fall session of parliament begins in October, will bring a vote of no confidence against the Fälldin government for its economic policy.

Such votes can certainly become necessary to demonstrate repudiation of a policy in general, which is not made clear in votes on specific issues.

Nevertheless, votes of no confidence are not a major issue in politics, if one examines the functioning of the single-chamber parliament during its first decade.

Of much greater importance than having votes of no confidence from the opposition is having governments that dare to put their own proposals up for a vote of confidence in parliament. In this way the main issues of policies are clearly and simply defined and it is easier for the voters to keep abreast and if a vote of confidence is lost it will be the people who settle the dispute at the polls. This is good for building confidence in the politicians.

If the trends from the first decade of the single-chamber parliament continue during the 1980's, the risk is great that the exercise of power will appear more important than convictions. In this case, there is the risk that the parliamentary system of government will be further eroded, while at the same time protest movements outside the political parties will gain increased elbow room.

9136
CSO: 3109

BANK ECONOMIST FORSEES DROP IN EXPORTS TO CONTINUE IN 1981

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Sep 80

[Text] Swedish exports of forest products and steel decreased in volume already during the first half of 1980. The decline is expected to continue during the second half year. The total figures for exports can be kept up by the machine industry and other smaller export branches. But the increase in exports for the entire year will remain about zero. And in 1981 we shall encounter a minus.

This is, according to what the chief of the economic secretariat of Handels Bank, Lars Jacobsson, informs DAGENS NYHETER, the preliminary result of the calculations which have been made by the secretariat.

This involves a significant reduction compared to previous prognostications.

The increase in the volume of exports was put at 5.8 percent in the revised national budget (RNB) at the end of April.

The finance committee of the parliament was a bit more cautious and gave as its figure 5.4 percent.

Budget Minister Rolf Wirten reduced the expectation to 3.8 percent in his proposal to increase the sales tax.

But according to Handels Bank this figure is also too high. The increase in exports will be insignificant.

Lars Jackobsson attributed the difference to the fact that Swedish exports have begun to feel the impact of the weakening of the international market earlier than previously anticipated.

At the Business Institute people are more inclined to attribute the development to other facts which can adversely affect exports in 1980: the labor conflict, the shortage of wood, and restrictions in the steel market in the European community, EC.

Yesterday there was published in a comprehensive article in SVENSKA DAGBLADET information from a study by Anders Rottorp of the Swedish Employers' Confederation's economic secretariat how Sweden's share of the OECD countries' total exports has developed since 1973. According to that study the Swedish share of the market in 1980 will fall, after a temporary increase in the previous year, to about 80 percent of the 1973 level.

This information is anything but sensational. It coincides, despite differences in the methods of calculating, quite well with the conclusions which the Business Institute made known earlier and which were published in the national budget among other places. They show a decrease in 18 percent from 1973.

The Handels Bank's figures also indicate a decrease in the Swedish share of the market in 1980. It is, Lars Jacobsson, a repetition of what happened in the previous swing in international business. Even in 1974 Sweden lost portions of the market in the final phase of the boom.

In connection with the publication of Anders Rottorp's analysis it is said that Sweden's exports have fallen to the lowest level they ever had. That isn't so, however you figure.

The value of exports in rising prices has more than doubled from the initial year 1973 to 1979, from 53 to 118 billion kronor. That does not say much, since inflation has been rampant the whole time. But even the volume of exports, that is, the exports with the price changes discounted, rose during the same period by 17 percent. With the weakest year in the period as a starting point, 1975, the increase was 21 percent.

Even if a further increase this year is almost completely out, 1980 will mark the greatest export in our history, not only in value but also in volume.

It is another matter that world trade has grown even faster, so that we must be content with a somewhat more modest share of the whole than during the golden years of the sixties.

6893
CSO: 3109

AGENCY REPORT: CIVIL DEFENSE MEDICAL SUPPLIES LACKING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Thomas Axner]

[Text] Sweden currently has very low stockpiles of medical supplies. Some medical articles would last only a few days in the event of war. Half the drugs we use are imported. This could be a problem even in peacetime, for example during an oil crisis.

This conclusion was reached by the Social Welfare Board, which was commissioned by the government to study health and medical care in the overall defense. The study will serve as a basis for the defense resoltuion of 1982.

The Social Welfare Board recommends that we begin emergency stockpiling. We should also take measures to secure increased imports of consumer goods during a crisis. At the same time, domestic production of these goods should be increased.

Lumped Together

One problem in this connection is that the equipment, materials, and drugs are being produced in larger and larger systems, while at the same time the stockpiles are lumped together. Both storage and production are vulnerable during wartime.

The goal of the overall defense is for everyone--regardless of his place of residence or occupation--to have the same opportunity for effective care. For military personnel, in addition to nurses, there will also be a doctor at a first-aid station near the combat zone. The civilian primary care units will be reinforced for them in wartime.

There will be a great need for surgical personnel. Although this category is increasing, there are regions in which preparedness is insufficient. Transfers are needed. In addition, operations, anaesthetic, and intensive care nurses must have an opportunity to receive training for wartime situations.

Reserve System

All buildings that are suitable for operations, for example certain schools, must be used. More mobile equipment must be produced.

"Military preparedness should also be taken into account in the peacetime planning of healthcare centers," Jan Hjelmstedt, head of the study by the Social Welfare Board says.

"For example, we should not place electric wires, water pipes, and telephone wires into the same cable duct. We should also have a reserve electrical system."

How the equipment is to be protected and where the acute care and operating rooms are to be should also be considered in peacetime, the Social Welfare Board says. Moving the bedridden to suitable shelters is out of the question. There is sufficient shelter space for only 5 to 15 percent of those requiring care.

Another weak point at present is the transition from civilian to military medical service, during mobilization that is. This can be solved in part by placing personnel at their own places of work. Medical personnel already placed with units engaged in combat would be excepted.

Affected Differently

In a war, the populace is affected differently in different parts of the country. The redistribution of medical care and the moving of those having lesser injuries to aid acute care make great demands on transportation and leadership.

A coordinated military and civilian transport command and less vulnerable vehicles, for example ambulance buses, are needed. Helicopters are needed for quick treatment of those with the worst injuries.

The Social Welfare Board itself wants responsibility for preparedness, while a head of medical care would be responsible for medical decisions with each area. Even before war breaks out this head of medical care should plan which personnel could easily be transferred in case of a catastrophe. If transportation is knocked out there can be an acute shortage of hospital beds. For this reason, the present ceiling of 124,000 beds should be removed, the Social Welfare Board believes.

In the wartime medical care plan for 1981 - 1986 the Social Welfare Board, in its primary alternative, is requesting 100 million kronor per year. No material costs are included in this figure.

9336
CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

CONSUMER CREDIT TIGHTENING--Stockholm, 13 Sep 80--Chargecard customers, furniture, radio and TV sales are some of the things affected by the new restrictions on chargecards. From the turn of the year, 25 percent of the sales price must be paid in cash as the first payment when a charge card is used. The credit firms and the minister of economic affairs, Gosta Bohman (conservative) have agreed on this. The measures are expected to have only a marginal effect on the state's economy and the financial companies. On the other hand, the possibilities for buying expensive furniture and stereo systems will be significantly reduced when one quarter of the entire amount has to be paid within a few weeks. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Sep 80 p 1] 6893

CSO: 3109

MILITARY COMMISSION OPTS FOR 'RAPIER' SYSTEM

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 13/14 Sep 80 p 11

[Article by Jean-Pierre Gattoni: "The Military Commission of the National in Agreement with this Purchase: 1.2 Billion for 60 'Rapiers'"]

[Text] Bern--In a few seconds, it "kills" an airplane: the British guided missile "Rapier," which the Swiss Army will buy in the next few years (if Parliament so decides), is a type of small explosive rocket capable of fighting against targets with a speed of mach 1.5 (1.5 times the speed of sound) that are at altitudes close to 3,000 meters and at distances of 7 km. A defensive device against airplanes, intended to "cover" mechanized divisions, the "Rapier" can also be transported by helicopter on a saddle, transported over a river, or again, placed...on a dwelling tower.

The firm British Aerospace perfected this device, which is operational in all weathers. The Swiss Army intends to buy from the British some 60 of these "Rapiers" for the paltry sum of 1.2 billion of our francs. The order is included in the 1980 armament program, along with the Skyguard, devices for control of firing of DCA lighting projectiles and Pinzgauer vehicles. All of this is worth 1.55 billion, price increases not included. The military commission of the National Council--unanimously, minus three abstensions --yesterday gave its blessing to this armament program, the highest of all time.

It is the "Rapier" that indisputably constitutes the "jewel" of this program. This guided missile for low-altitude anti-aircraft defense is, in fact, composed of several components that make it a veritable autonomous firing unit on which our mechanized divisions engaged in combat will be able to rely. There is a launching ramp, a tracking radar, a signaling device, optical tracking equipment, two generating sets and the guided missile

itself, which explodes on striking the target. After 14 years (not less) of studies and tests, this "Rapier" system will be introduced in the army starting in 1983. As of now, 340 "Rapier" weapon systems and 121,000 guided missiles have been produced. More than 3,600 of these toys have been fired by military units in training. According to our military high command, and particularly Corps Commander Bolliger, the aviation chief--the reliability of this device exceeds 90 percent. All the mechanized divisions will thus be equipped with it. But its good mobility (limited weight) will make it possible for the "Rapier" to be used in several areas of anti-aircraft protection. It should further be noted that the isolated components of the "Rapier" scattered on the ground are already, at a distance of some hundreds of meters, no longer recognizable. This "camouflage" aspect is important if we consider that the "Rapier" is utilizable only in open country.

The "Rapier" was in competition--roughly--with three other systems of defense against airplanes: the RBS 70, the Roland, and another device combining anti-aircraft and antitank defense developed by two firms (Buhrie, and the American firm Martin-Marietta). The big drawback of the RBS 70 (at the same cost) is the following: it operates only in clear weather. Now, in Switzerland, mediocre visibility is often the rule. The Roland, a French-German self-propelled guided missile system, should have been ideal, since it combines mobility and protection against shrapnel. The Americans are now developing a version of it which would be...twice as costly as the "Rapier." As to the European versions, they have the great disadvantage, in the eyes of our military men, of being usable only with tracked vehicles. These vehicles have not been introduced in the Swiss Army, the excess cost here would be considerable. the Buhrie-Marietta combined device called ADATS (air defense antitank system) could not, for its part, according to the most optimistic forecasts, be introduced into the army until 1988.

Thirty Years of Patience

The "Rapier" comes to the fore, therefore, without being, for that matter, an ideal system, but because of the very fact that the mechanized troops have had enough of waiting. They have given proof of patience for 30 years. It is their "patron," Major General Haner, who stressed this during a press conference at Emmen in the canton of Lucerne. It must be added, in truth, that the choice of the "Rapier" was dictated by five major criteria: its reliability and performance; its relative ease of handling, an important criterion in any army made op of militia; the fact that it is an "all-weather" device; the distance at which it is effective; and lastly its "price per kilo," established on the basis of the execution of a war mission by a mechanized formation for an identical defensive force.

These criteria have also been accepted by the majority of the National's military commission, chaired by the Radical member from Zurich, Rudolph Friedrich. The commission has thus given its support to the 1980 armament program, which beside the "Rapier" includes the acquisition of infantry projectiles, devices for control of firing and signaling, and lastly ambulances.

The three commissioners (socialists) who abstained indeed did not speak against this acquisitions program, but they intend to link their future approval to the condition that the Federal Council and Parliament commit themselves firmly to the search for new financial receipts.

French-speaking Swiss Industrialists in the Deal

The "Rapier" system will cost roughly 1.2 billion. Swiss industry, including the federal armament factories, will take part in the production of all the components of the system at the rate of 30 percent, that is, a sum of some 315 million, broken down as follows: 230 million for the guided missile itself: 10 percent in French-speaking Switzerland and 90 percent in German-speaking Switzerland; 85 million for the rest (radar, command system, etc.); 40 percent in French-speaking Switzerland and 60 percent in German-speaking Switzerland.

These are some of the French-speaking Swiss firms with which orders will be placed: Gallay SA: Derendinger SA: Hispano and Tavaro in Geneva: Dubied and Company, the industrial and radioelectric company in the canton of Neuchatel. Twenty-six firms are concerned in all.

9434
CSO: 3100

NEW FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON POLICIES

Geneva JOURNAL DF GENEVE in French 12 Sep 80 p 10

[Interview with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Raymond Probst, by Jacques-Simon Eggly--date and place not given]

[Text] A tribute was paid in this newspaper to Secretary of State Albert Weitnauer at the time of his retirement at the end of August. It was logical for us to become acquainted with the new secretary of state, Raymond Probst, until then ambassador to Washington. In any event, he had been mentioned for this post, but the passing of the baton took place sooner than anticipated under the rather painful circumstances we know. And it is therefore on this point that we have first interrogated the top official in the Federal Foreign Affairs Department.

[Answer] I am arriving in fact at the end of a crisis which has shaken the department. My predecessor was a man of high quality, everyone recognizes this. But undoubtedly there was not, at the side of a new department chief, Mr Pierre Aubert, who himself did not have any cantonal government experience, a man truly empowered to facilitate the harmonious, regular functioning of the administrative machine. As a result, there were short circuits, duplication of procedures, and, indeed, a sort of general insecurity affecting both the workers in the department and the chief himself. My first task is thus to retie the threads, to restore confidence, to be the official centralizer of everything prepared by the department in all sectors, align the files arrive clear [as published] to the chief of the department. What is needed is unity of doctrine, together with efficiency in the operation of the machine. I declare that this mission of [illegible]ing is desired by Mr Pierre Aubert and by the Federal Council.

[Question] You speak of unity of doctrine: did the indecision provoke any contradictions?

[Answer] Yes, for example, with regard to the very important question of our relations with the Third World and our cooperation in development. For lack of sufficient coordination, we saw emerge a sort of separate doctrine, a sort of policy suited to serve technical cooperation, going so far as to dispute the doctrine inspiring our trade relations. It is urgent to restore there our cooperation in development in the framework of our general policy vis-a-vis the Third World desired by the Federal Council, with the support of Parliament and the people. Here is thus a typical case where a malfunction of the apparatus could lead, in the long run, to serious consequences.

[Question] Much has been said of activating or reactivating our foreign policy. What do you think of this?

[Answer] I do not like these terms in the form of a slogan, and I have said so. At the political level, my role is certainly to contribute to inspiring a necessary continuity of substance, but also one of style, in the expression of our policy of neutrality. Indeed, this is confronted with a new, difficult world, in constant evolution. Of course, Switzerland should take part in crucial debates on European security, on the North-South dialog, on energy. But the affirmation of our policy of neutrality should remain firm and recognizable.

The United Nations: For and Against

[Question] In this connection, Switzerland's entry into the United Nations is often brought up, but mention is made of our joining the International Monetary Fund, to say nothing of the European social charter.

[Answer] That is, indeed, a good deal, I would be tempted to say too much at one time. It is difficult to see Parliament and the people almost simultaneously ratifying the joining of all three. Personally, I think that joining the Monetary Fund is the most urgent.

[Question] But do you consider our joining the UN to be necessary?

[Answer] I will be responsible for defending the position which the Federal Council and Parliament will recommend in this connection. For my part, I believe it fair to say that our absence from the UN has its drawbacks, but also its advantages. In an objective evaluation, we should conclude that the arguments in favor of joining are more numerous than the arguments against. But we might perhaps not have had, as I could see when I was ambassador to Washington, the position of irreplaceable intermediary in the Iranian affair if we had been a member of the United Nations. It is clear that the department will have to find some sort of sure rhythm when it finds itself confronted simultaneously with numerous ticklish matters.

[Question] There was an entire sector of our diplomacy, particularly regarding questions of European security or of nuclear nonproliferation, that was in the hands of the official council lawyer, Mr Pindschedler. Will you also take over control of these files?

[Answer] Yes. There again unity of doctrine and a view of all sides of these questions are necessary. Let us take up the nuclear question: we are faced with an American policy which can frustrate us. It is often necessary to negotiate very closely on these questions, to seek--to persuade, to convince. Now the stake for us is considerable.

[Question] Taking over the apparatus, knowledge of the files under all their aspects, a return to a more rigorous and more continuous expression of our foreign policy: isn't this program a little ambitious, Mr Secretary of State?

[Answer] You know, with regard to the first task, I am not a stranger in this department and I am not coming upon strangers. In a few days I have already found again the old thread of my collaboration with several high department officials. If on top of this, procedures are clarified, if confidence is reborn, and it--I feel it already, I am relying on the evident desire of all to pull together, to be efficient. I believe that the department should again become fully operational in the service of the Federal Council from now to the end of the year. As to political matters, I have the benefit, happily, of a good conjunction of experiences to master them.

[Question] But you do not have much time ahead of you to assume this heavy role, since you are not very far from retirement.

[Answer] That is true. But the circumstances of my career and my temperament make me, I believe, a diplomat of the modern school, perfectly at ease with the younger workers in the department and with the department chief, Mr Pierre Aubert. That is very important. Moreover, I have the good fortune of having a solid physical constitution, sustained by sports activities, full of energy. In other words, these few years should be lived at full speed, with, I think an energizing effect on the department.

[Question] Very well, have a good trip, Mr Secretary; we will try from a distance, with binoculars, not to lose track of you.

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October 29, 1980

Debbie